This is part of a Hub and Spoke series on Antitrust Policy under Trump 2.0. You can find the Hub and Spoke’s previous coverage here, here, and here.
On July 8, 2025, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division announced (opens in a new tab) a first-of-its-kind whistleblower rewards program for reporting criminal antitrust violations that result in at least $1 million in fines or penalties.
Although the violation must have some connection to the postal service, a broad reading of the MOU (opens in a new tab) between DOJ, USPS, and the Postal Service Office of the Inspector General (USPS OIG), suggests that any mailed correspondence between co-conspirators or use of the mails in carrying out the antitrust violation would suffice, such as sending price-fixed goods to consumers.
The whistleblower rewards program is a welcome addition to the DOJ’s enforcement arsenal, as it fills a gap opened by the declining use of the DOJ’s antitrust leniency program.
Launched in 1993, the leniency program initially led to numerous high-profile antitrust investigations and prosecutions. As a result of DOJ’s vitamin cartel investigation and prosecutions, the Antitrust Division in 1999 collected (opens in a new tab) $500 million from F. Hoffman LaRoche alone. The air transportation investigations and prosecutions of the late 2000s resulted in criminal fines and penalties exceeding (opens in a new tab) $1.9 billion. And in 2015, the Division collected a staggering $3.6 billion in criminal fines and penalties.
Despite its earlier success, the DOJ’s leniency program has fallen into relative disuse (opens in a new tab) as evidenced by a precipitously declining number of antitrust prosecutions. For example, compared to the historic highs from its early period, in 2024, the DOJ collected a mere $10.6 million in antitrust fines. These declining prosecutions suggest that cartel behavior may be going undetected and unpunished. The prospect of financial reward for whistleblowing witnesses and minor participants may, therefore, resurrect the Division’s criminal prosecution program which was otherwise on life support.
There are, however, a few significant caveats on eligibility for rewards through the new program:
First, the whistleblower must not have been the “leader or originator” of the illegal activity, nor coerced anyone else to participate. This distinction protects against the circumstances that befell Mark Whitacre. Whitacre (later played by Matt Damon in The Informant) was a whistleblower and FBI informant against Archer Daniels Midland and its co-conspirators in a price-fixing scheme involving Lysine. Only later in the course of Whitacre’s three-year tenure as an FBI informant did it come to light that he was also embezzling money from ADM. Because he also participated in the conspiracy, he eventually served the longest prison sentence even though the conspiracy could not have been successfully prosecuted without him.
Second, the information provided must be original and voluntary. The DOJ will not reward tipsters who supply information already known to the government or who are compelled to report through subpoena, discovery, or other legal obligations. This echoes a familiar principle from other whistleblower frameworks like those at the SEC or IRS: the government wants actionable intelligence. This requirement also underscores DOJ’s successful track record of detecting cartels through its own analysis of public data through its Procurement Collusion Strike Force.
Specifically, as of November 21, 2024, the PCSF and the Antitrust Division (opens in a new tab) “have opened over 145 criminal investigations and obtained over 60 convictions for crimes involving over $575 million worth of government contracts and kickbacks.”
Looking Ahead
If past is prologue, the SEC’s whistleblower program created by the Dodd-Frank Act, is a useful benchmark to predict how this new program will impact antitrust enforcement. In a little over a decade since its inception, the SEC has awarded (opens in a new tab) over $2.2 billion to nearly 450 whistleblowers. The program has been deployed to prosecute market manipulation and frauds that harm everyday investors and that might have otherwise gone undetected.
We predict that the DOJ’s whistleblower rewards program will do the same for antitrust enforcement. Moreover, with the prices of essential goods rising every day, this program could not come at a more opportune time. Pandemic-related supply disruptions and inflation have provided the kind of cover that cartels can exploit to raise prices far in excess of costs. Illegal price fixing, market allocation, and other antitrust conspiracies harm consumers and hurt the economy. Now, whistleblowers have a potent reason to come forward and expose wrongdoing. As such, we expect the new whistleblower rewards program to reinvigorate criminal antitrust enforcement in the United States and restore markets to a more competitive balance.